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Analysis
REPEALING THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
BELFAST AGREEMENT
Introduction
With the recently elected Conservative Government holding amajority in Parliament, the
Party has reiterated its manifesto pledge to ‘scrap the Human Rights Act and curtail the
role of the European Court of Human Rights’.1 While the possibility of a United
Kingdom withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has
beenmooted in the past,2 recent pledges of the Conservative Party have focused on repeal-
ing the instrument that incorporated the Convention into domestic law, the Human
Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998). Instead of returning to the situation that existed prior to
incorporation,3 the Conservative Party has plans to introduce a new ‘British Bill of
1 Conservative Party Manifesto, ‘Strong Leadership, a Clear Economic Plan, a Brighter, More Secure Future’
(2015) 75 <www.conservatives.com/manifesto> accessed 10 August 2015. The repeal of the Human Rights
Act 1998 (HRA 1998) has been a part of Conservative Party policy for some time. Indeed, in 2006, the
Conservative Party’s general programme of constitutional reform indicated the Party’s intention to
replace the HRA 1998 with a ‘Modern Bill of Rights’ for Britain. These plans were of course hindered
by the outcome of the 2010 General Election, which placed the Conservative Party in coalition with
the HRA 1998 supporters, the Liberal Democrats. David Cameron, ‘Balancing Freedom and Security—
A Modern British Bill of Rights’ (Speech to the Centre for Policy Studies, London, 26 June 2006).
Helen Fenwick, ‘The Human Rights Act or a British Bill of Rights: Creating a Down-grading Recalibration
of Rights against the Counter-terror Backdrop?’ [2012] Public Law 468.
2 The Conservatives’ proposals for changing Britain’s human rights laws, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the
UK’ (3 October 2014) <www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/downloadable%20Files/human_rights.
pdf> accessed 10 August 2015.
3 Regardless of domestic incorporation, the ECHR is binding on State Parties under international law.
Article 1 obliges State Parties to secure ‘to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms’
of the Convention. In spite of this international obligation, without incorporation, the Convention is
not a binding instrument as a matter of domestic law. Under the HRA 1998, it is unlawful for public auth-
orities to act in a manner that is incompatible with ECHR rights and UK courts are obliged to interpret
legislation in a manner that is compatible with Convention rights in so far as is possible. The HRA 1998
enables individuals to seek redress for breaches of their rights in domestic courts. It has been pointed out
that the domestic rights as currently stated in the HRA 1998 are ‘mere duplicates’ of those contained in the
ECHR. See HRA 1998, s 1; see Dominic Grieve, ‘Attorney General: European Convention on Human
Rights: Current Challenges’ (Gov.uk, 24 October 2010) <www.gov.uk/government/speeches/european-
convention-on-human-rights-current-challenges> accessed 10 August 2015; and see also Lord Slynn
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Rights’ (BBoR). The Conservative Party has yet to provide a detailed description of its
reform plans, but the Party has expressed a desire to ‘remain faithful to the basic principles
of human rights’which the UK ‘signed up to’ in the ‘original’ ECHR.4 TheManifesto goes
on to state that the Bill would protect basic rights ‘like the right to a fair trial, and the right
to life’.5 Although theremay be some potential for a BBoR to improve on the existing pro-
tection of certain ‘uniquely British’ rights, it has been pointed out that such a document is
more likely to reduce the protection of existing rights.6
The repeal of the HRA 1998 and the introduction of a BBoR might be more challen-
ging, both politically and legally, than the Party had originally envisioned, particularly in
light of the increasingly devolved structure of UK governance. Notably, current conven-
tion requires the Westminster Parliament to obtain consent from the devolved legisla-
tures in order to legislate in certain devolved matters. While the Sewel Convention
states that the UK Parliament retains legislative authority on devolved issues of compe-
tence, it asserts that the UK Parliament would not ‘normally legislate with regard to
devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved legislature’.7
and the ‘mirror principle’ in R (Alconbury Devs Ltd) v Sec’y of State for the Env’t Transp & the Regions
[2001] UKHL 23, [2003] 2 AC 295 [26]. Accordingly, domestic rights protection under the HRA 1998
is strongly linked with the European layer of protection. See Sarah Lambrecht, ‘Bringing Rights More
Home: Can a Home-Grown UK Bill of Rights Lessen the Influence of the European Court of Human
Rights?’ (2014) 15(3) German Law Journal 407, 414. It must be acknowledged, however, that as long as
the UK remains party to the Convention, connections would remain. Although the primary duty of
State Parties is to comply with judgments in cases to which they are a party, and it is uncertain
whether judgments of the ECtHR have effect erga omnes, the manner of interpretation and application
by the ECtHR of the Convention rights is generally regarded as authoritative. K Zweigert and H Kötz,
An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 1998); Costas Paraskeva, The Relationship
between the Domestic Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Ongoing
Reforms of the European Court of Human Rights (with a Case Study on Cyprus and Turkey) (Intersentia
2010) 9; Georg Ress, ‘The Effect of Decisions and Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
in the Domestic Legal Order’ (2004–05) 40 Texas International Law Journal 359, 374; Janneke Gerards
and Hanneke Senden, ‘The Structure of Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights’ (2009) 7(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 619, 637.
4 Conservative Party Manifesto, ‘Strong Leadership, a Clear Economic Plan, a Brighter, More Secure Future’
(2015) 73 <www.conservatives.com/manifesto> accessed 10 August 2015. The most recent policy docu-
ment released by the Conservative Party on this issue was the Conservatives’ proposals for changing Brit-
ain’s human rights laws, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK’ (3 October 2014) <www.conservatives.
com/~/media/files/downloadable%20Files/human_rights.pdf> accessed 10 August 2015.
5 Conservative Party Manifesto, ‘Strong Leadership, a Clear Economic Plan, a Brighter, More Secure Future’
(2015) 73 <www.conservatives.com/manifesto> accessed 10 August 2015.
6 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Tobias Lock (eds), ‘The Legal Implications of a Repeal of the Human Rights
Act 1998 and Withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights’ (12 May 2015) 12, 19–20
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2605487> accessed 10 August 2015.
7 Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements Between the United KingdomGovernment,
the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee (October 2013);
ChrisMcCorkindale, ‘EchoChamber: The 2015General Election atHolyrood—aWord on Sewel Posted’ (Scot-
tish Constitutional Futures Forum, 13 May 2015) <www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis/
ViewBlogPost/tabid/1767/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/5594/Chris-McCorkindale-Echo-Chamber-the-
2015-General-Election-at-Holyrood-a-word-on-Sewel.aspx> accesssed 10 August 2015.
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Dzehtsiarou and Lock have noted that the legal implications of the Sewel Conven-
tion in the human rights context are ‘somewhat unclear’, with some commentators
going so far as to argue that any repeal of the HRA 1998 will require the consent of
the devolved legislatures.8 Even if a ‘wholesale repeal’ of the HRA 1998 is possible
without the consent of the devolved legislatures, the introduction of a new BBoR as
replacement legislation would most likely require consent.9
In spite of this uncertainty, it is clear that significant constitutional obstacles will need
to be overcome if the Conservative Party is to be successful in its pursuit of repeal of the
HRA1998.10 From the Irish perspective, it is particularly important to consider the impact
a repeal of the HRA 1998 would have on the Belfast Agreement.11 While the output from
the negotiations that led to the Belfast Agreement can be distinguished as two separate
agreements—the Multi-Party Agreement and the British-Irish Agreement—each agree-
ment is dependent on the other.12 While the Multi-Party Agreement was reached
between theUK and Irish Governments with themajority of the political parties ofNorth-
ern Ireland, the British-Irish Agreement was reached between the UK and Irish Govern-
ments alone. In order to appreciate the significance of the proposed repeal, the political
and legal context at the time of HRA 1998 enactment must be considered.13
8 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Tobias Lock (eds), ‘The Legal Implications of a Repeal of the Human Rights
Act 1998 and Withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights’ (12 May 2015) 12 <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2605487> accessed 10 August 2015.
9 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Tobias Lock (eds), ‘The Legal Implications of a Repeal of the Human Rights
Act 1998 and Withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights’ (12 May 2015) 12 <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2605487> accessed 10 August 2015.
10 David Allen Green, ‘Why Repealing the Human Rights Act Is Not Going to Be Easy’ Financial Times
(London, 12 May 2015) <http://blogs.ft.com/david-allen-green/2015/05/12/why-repealing-the-human-
rights-act-is-not-going-to-be-easy/> accesssed 10 August 2015; Aileen McHarg, ‘Will Devolution
Scupper Conservative Plans for a “British” Bill of Rights?’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 2 October 2014)
<ukhumanrightsblog.com/2014/10/02/will-devolution-scupper-conservative-plans-for-a-british-bill-of-
rights/> accesssed 10 August 2015.
11 Otherwise known as the Good Friday Agreement. David O’Sullivan, ‘The Good Friday Agreement: A New
Constitutional Settlement for Northern Ireland’ (2000) 22 Dublin University Law Journal 112. In addition
to the issue of human rights being a partially devolved competency, the Northern Ireland Act 1998
includes explicit reference to the HRA 1998.
12 TheMulti-Party Agreement is linked to the British-Irish Agreement directly in Article 2 of the British-Irish
Agreement. In addition, the Multi-Party Agreement is annexed to the British-Irish Agreement and vice
versa. David Byrne, ‘An Irish View of the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement: The Interaction of Law
and Politics’ (1998) 22(4) Fordham International Law Journal 1206, 1207, 1211, 1212.
13 Of course, the full implementation of the Belfast Agreement has faced difficulties from the beginning,
which has led to numerous suspensions of the devolved assembly. While there is no ‘express provision
for suspension of institutions’ in the Belfast Agreement, Morgan has pointed out that that does not
render a suspension unlawful. In 2006, the St Andrews Agreement broke the political stalemate by
laying out changes to the power-sharing institutions and human rights. Police powers had remained a
reserved power due to the decision to postpone consideration of this issue during the Belfast Agreement
negotiations. Police powers were put back on the table in the St Andrews Agreement negotiations, where
such devolution was recommended. The ‘Hillsborough Agreement’, approved by the Northern Ireland
Assembly in 2010 agreed on the date for transferring police powers from London to Belfast. This agree-
ment was praised as constituting a significant step towards full implementation of the Belfast Agreement.
Austen Morgan, ‘Legal Case Against Suspension Falls Flat’ Irish Times (Dublin, 10 March 2000)
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Background to Incorporation
Most of the members of the Council of Europe operate as monist systems, where inter-
national law is considered automatically applicable.14 Ireland and the UK are notable
exceptions amongst the Council of Europe members.15 Both are dualist nations that
require either legislative or constitutional incorporation of a treaty before it becomes
part of domestic law.16 In line with this, following ratification of the ECHR, Ireland
and the UK had international law obligations towards the other signatory states, but
the same obligations did not exist domestically. In spite of the UK and Ireland ratifying
the ECHR in 1951 and 1953 respectively, the countries did not incorporate the Conven-
tion into domestic law until the enactment of the UK HRA 1998 and Ireland’s European
Convention on Human Rights Act (ECHR Act) in 2003.
The dualist nature of both systems explains the lack of immediate domestic effect,
but it does not explain the reason for the delayed incorporation. For example, Article
29.3 of the Irish Constitution acknowledges Ireland’s acceptance of ‘the generally recog-
nised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other
States’ and a clear process is provided for treaty incorporation in Article 29. Accordingly,
there must have been other explanations for the decision made by successive Irish and
UK Governments to ignore the issue of incorporation. A primary reason for the Irish
delay was the contention that the rights of the Convention were adequately protected
under the Irish Constitution and through the robust tradition of judicial review.17
4. Committee A (Sovereign Matters) British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Report on the Implemen-
tation of the Good Friday/Belfast and St Andrews Agreements’ (March 2014) 4 <www.britishirish.org/
assets/Uploads/2013-Files/Report-into-the-Implementation-of-the-Good-Friday-Belfast-and-St-
Andrews-Agreements-FINAL.pdf> accesssed 10 August 2015; Kristin Archick, ‘Northern Ireland: The
Peace Process’ (Congressional Research Service Report, 11 March 2015) 2 <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RS21333.pdf> accesssed 10 August 2015.
14 For example in France the Constitution of 1958 states in Article 55 that treaties ‘prevail’ over national law.
15 Other states, for example Belgium, Norway and Sweden are ‘formally dualist’, but have adopted monist
approaches to the ECHR. While Germany is a dualist state with a complete system of domestic rights pro-
tection, the Federal Constitutional Court requires enforcement of Convention rights against statutes,
including statutes passed subsequently. Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Assessing the Impact of the
ECHR on National Legal Systems’ in Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights: The
Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford University Press 2008) 683, 684, 685.
16 Article 15.2.1 of the Irish Constitution vests ‘the sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State’ in
the Oireachtas. In addition, Article 29.6 states, ‘no international agreement shall be part of the domestic
law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas’.
17 Ireland’s Fundamental Rights Provisions contained in Articles 40 to 44 of the Constitution include protec-
tion of equality before the law, protection of personal rights and the defence of the ‘life, person, good name
and property rights of every citizen’, protection of the ‘right to life’, protection of freedom of speech,
freedom of assembly, freedom of association, protection of family and home life, protection of the
right to education, protection of private property and freedom of worship. The largely civil and political
rights protected by the express provisions of the Constitution are further supplemented by the concept of
unenumerated rights, supported by language in Article 40.3, which the courts have held to protect rights
under natural law. Such rights have included the right to ‘bodily integrity’ and ‘marital privacy’. In spite of
the overlap between the two systems of protection, there are clear instances where the Strasbourg Court
has ruled differently under the ECHR than the Irish Supreme Court has under the Constitution. For
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The reasons for the delayed incorporation of the Convention in domestic UK law were
similar. Although the UK does not have a written constitution in the manner of the Irish
Constitution—with its explicit protection of certain fundamental rights—the protection
of civil liberties is considered engrained in the UK legal culture. Politicians frequently
refer to Magna Carta and the fact that British civil servants played a central role in the
design of the ECHR as evidence of this. In spite of this history, the 1990s saw popular
demand for ‘bringing rights home’ grow and the Labour Party ran with the issue of incor-
poration as part of its 1997 New Labour election platform.18 Provision is made in the Con-
vention to enable individuals to take their grievances to Strasbourg once they have
exhausted domestic remedies; however, this is a time-consuming and costly process and
would exclude many from the opportunity to pursue their rights. The average Strasbourg
case lasts many years from beginning to conclusion; the risk of delayed justice becoming
denied justice is high. With the prospect of a lengthy legal battle, when even victory might
be followed by significant delay in any domestic changes, the individual petition procedure
could be seen as a daunting and potentially fruitless exercise, that only the most dedicated
(and adequately funded) could undertake. Some form of incorporation is therefore desir-
able in order to bring these rights closer to home and more accessible to the individual.
Incorporation and the Belfast Agreement
With the agreement of most of the political parties in Northern Ireland,19 the Belfast
Agreement was signed by the Governments of Ireland and the UK on 10 April 1998.
The Belfast Agreement was subsequently endorsed in referenda held in both the
North and South of Ireland.20 Under the Belfast Agreement, the jurisdictional and
governmental relations between Ireland and the UK were accepted by both parties
and provision was made for a power-sharing executive, a democratically elected
example, in Norris v Ireland, the ECtHR ruled that the continued existence of Victorian laws criminalising
the practice of homosexuality was a violation of the ECHR; the Irish Supreme Court had previously held
that the law was not unconstitutional. Norris v Ireland (1988) 13 EHRR 186; Norris v Attorney General
[1984] IR 36. See Katherine Lesch Bodnick, ‘Bringing Ireland up to Par: Incorporating the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (2002) 26(2) Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal 396; Suzanne Egan, ‘Implementing the ECHR in Ireland: Past, Present and
Future’ in Suzanne Egan, Liam Thornton and Judy Walsh (eds), Ireland and the European Convention
on Human Rights: 60 Years and Beyond (Bloomsbury 2014) 1, 11.
18 Labour Party Manifesto, ‘New Labour because Britain Deserves Better’ (1997) <www.politicsresources.
net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm> accesssed 10 August 2015.
19 With the notable exception of the Democratic Unionist Party, the Belfast Agreement received support
from the Ulster Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, Sinn Féin, the Alliance Party,
the Progressive Unionist Party, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, the Ulster Democratic Party
and Labour. Austen Morgan, The Belfast Agreement: A Practical Legal Analysis (The Belfast Press 2000) 6.
20 While the Northern Irish referendum asked the electorate to express approval or disapproval of the full
text of the Agreement, the Irish referendum only asked the electorate to vote on the necessary consti-
tutional amendment. An 81.1% turnout in the Northern Irish referendum resulted in a 71.12% ‘yes’
vote and a 56.3% turnout in the Irish referendum resulted in a 94.39% ‘yes’ vote. Austen Morgan, The
Belfast Agreement: A Practical Legal Analysis (The Belfast Press 2000) 6–7.
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Assembly and a cross-community voting scheme.21 In addition, the Belfast Agreement
provided for a commitment to human rights and equality, including provisions relating
to the release of political prisoners, reform of the criminal justice system, the decommis-
sioning of paramilitary weapons and the enumeration of human rights.
As previously stated, the Belfast Agreement is comprised of two separate, but linked,
documents—the Multi-Party Agreement22 and the British-Irish Agreement.23 While the
British-Irish Agreement is a binding treaty, recognised under international law, the legal
status of the Multi-Party Agreement is less clear. While the two documents are partially
connected through cross-annexation, a crucial section of the British-Irish Agreement
states that the ‘two Governments affirm their solemn commitment to support, and
where appropriate implement, the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement’.24 This
imposes an international law obligation on the UK and Irish Governments to support
and, where appropriate, implement the Multi-Party Agreement. While the existence
of an obligation is clear, the concrete requirements imposed by this obligation
demand closer examination. The decision to utilise the treaty-making power and to
connect the two documents indicated the willingness of the States to be bound to the
Belfast Agreement and enhanced the credibility of the commitments made.25
The Multi-Party Agreement clearly states that the British Government ‘will complete
incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human
Rights, with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention’.26
The Multi-Party Agreement is primarily a political agreement, but the decision to link
it with the British-Irish Agreement enhances its legal status. While certain aspects of
the Belfast Agreement have been described as ‘imprecise and aspirational’, the commit-
ment agreed to by the UK Government to incorporate the Convention is specific and
concrete.27 As a result of the specificity of the commitment to incorporate, combined
with the obligation to implement the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement where
appropriate, it seems clear that the UK was obliged under international law to incorpor-
ate the ECHR into Northern Irish domestic law.28 If the UK reversed incorporation of
the ECHR or removed direct access to the courts for Convention breaches in Northern
Ireland, the UK would be in breach of its international obligations.
The legal obligation to incorporate the Convention into Northern Irish law did not
necessarily require incorporation of the ECHR throughout the rest of the UK. While
21 This required changes to the Irish Constitution, including removal of the assertion of Article 2 that ‘the
national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas’. The provisions
on power-sharing and cross-community voting were designed to ensure that neither Unionists nor
Nationalists dominated the Assembly.
22 Signed by both Governments and supporting political parties.
23 Signed solely by the British and Irish Governments.
24 British-Irish Agreement 1998, Art 2.
25 Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54(3) Inter-
national Organization 421, 422.
26 Multi-Party Agreement 1998, 6.2.
27 O’Neill and Quinn v Governor of Castlerea Prison [2004] IESC 7.
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Art 26.
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the application of the HRA 1998 throughout the UK enjoyed cross-party support in 1998,
in the current climate, repeal of the HRA 1998 in England alone could be deemed a sen-
sible compromise solution. Not only would such an option avoid the thorny devolution
questions, it would also prevent theUK frombreaching its international obligations under
the Belfast Agreement. It has been argued that there is nothing ‘inherently undesirable’
about asymmetry of rights within a State; however, repealing the HRA 1998 in England
alone would create a two-tiered system of protection with the potential for significant
inequality in the areas of health, education and criminal justice.29 Such differences
would not be particularly conducive to a ‘united’ United Kingdom.30 Aileen McHarg
points out that the creation of new ‘constitutional differences between the constituent
parts of the UK’ would be ‘counter-productive’.31 If Westminster identifies a solution
to the devolution difficulties and replaces the HRA 1998 with a BBoR in England,
Wales and Scotland alone, tensions could rise as the omission of Northern Ireland
could aggravate those in theNorthern IrishUnionist communitywho identify as British.32
Setting aside consideration of regional repeal of the HRA 1998 for now, it could also
be argued that a new BBoR—passed into law simultaneously with the repeal of the HRA
1998 and applicable across the UK—could potentially be considered an adequate incor-
poration of the ECHR for the purposes of the Belfast Agreement.33 In order to comply
29 While some differences already exist between the human rights regimes, the current differences are ‘rela-
tively minor’ and tend to concern ‘machinery rather than substance’. Robert Hazell and Bob Morris,
‘Will Plans for a British Bill of Rights Be Reduced to a Bill for England Only? (The Constitution Unit,
15 May 2015) <constitution-unit.com/2015/05/15/will-plans-for-a-british-bill-of-rights-be-reduced-to-a-
bill-for-england-only/> accessed 10 August 2015; Anthony Speaight, ‘Devolution Options’ in Members of
the Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us Volume 1 (2012) 243, 256
<webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130128112038/http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/cbr/uk-
bill-rights-vol-1.pdf> accessed 10 August 2015.
30 Such differences could be particularly disruptive in the current environment, where uncertainty remains about
Scotland’s futurewithin theUnion. ‘Nicola Sturgeon: Vote to Leave the EUCould Lead to Second Scottish Inde-
pendence Referendum’ The Telegraph (London, 21 April 2015) <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/SNP/
11551484/Nicola-Sturgeon-Vote-to-leave-the-EU-could-lead-to-second-Scottish-independence-referendum.
html> accessed 10 August 2015.
31 Aileen McHarg, ‘Will Devolution Scupper Conservative Plans for a “British” Bill of Rights?’ (UK Human
Rights Blog, 2 October 2014) <ukhumanrightsblog.com/2014/10/02/will-devolution-scupper-conserva-
tive-plans-for-a-british-bill-of-rights/> accessed 10 August 2015.
32 Justice, ‘Devolution and Human Rights’ (February 2010) <2bquk8cdew6192tsu41lay8t.wpengine.netdna-
cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Devolution-and-Human-Rights-8-February-20101.pdf> accessed
10 August 2015.
33 While the Agreement made some provision to allow for the introduction of a Northern Ireland Bill of
Rights, it is made equally clear that such an instrument would be ‘supplementary’ to the ECHR; see
Multi-Party Agreement, 6.4. While the introduction of such a Bill has been stalled, it is an area that
rests primarily within the competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly and is not relevant to this dis-
cussion. Committee A (Sovereign Matters) British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Report on the
Implementation of the Good Friday/Belfast and St Andrews Agreements’ (March 2014) 11 <www.
britishirish.org/assets/Uploads/2013-Files/Report-into-the-Implementation-of-the-Good-Friday-Belfast-
and-St-Andrews-Agreements-FINAL.pdf> accesssed 10 August 2015; Thus far, provision made for the
consideration of a charter ‘reflecting and endorsing agreed measures for the protection of fundamental
rights for everyone in the island of Ireland’ has remained unused. Multi-Party Agreement, 6.10.
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with the text of the Belfast Agreement, however, a new Bill of Rights would have to facili-
tate direct access to the courts and access to remedies for breaches of the Convention. In
light of the recent rhetoric, and with consideration of previous Conservative proposals, it
is highly questionable whether the reform as currently posited would adequately provide
for this access.34 Of particular concern is the suggestion that a BBoR would ‘clarify’ the
ECHR in certain ways that would conflict with the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR).35 Another potentially problematic proposal is the imposition of a new
threshold that only permits access to courts for ‘serious’ cases. While domestic courts
already dismiss trivial cases, a new and undefined (and potentially value-laden)
threshold of ‘seriousness’ could undermine the commitment of the UK to facilitate
direct access to the courts and to remedies for breaches of the Convention.
It is important to point out that international law makes provision for the renegotia-
tion of treaties. By definition, however, such renegotiation should not be a unilateral
project.36 Gerald Fitzmaurice has written that there is an assumption that treaties are of
‘indefinite duration, and only terminable … by mutual agreement on the part of all
the parties’.37 While some treaties build in provisions that facilitate withdrawal or rene-
gotiation, such provisions are not essential. In fact, the Vienna Convention contains 13
articles that make provision for termination, denunciation, or withdrawal in the
absence of treaty-specific options providing for such actions.38 Article 59 of the Vienna
Convention is particularly relevant as it states that a treaty ‘shall be considered as termi-
nated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject matter’.39 As
renegotiation ismore challenging inmultilateral agreements (due to the number of parties
involved), the bilateral nature of the British-Irish Agreement should make the possibility
34 The Conservatives’ proposals for changing Britain’s human rights laws, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the
UK’ (3 October 2014) <www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/downloadable%20Files/human_rights.
pdf> accessed 10 August 2015.
35 For example, the 2014 Conservative Party policy document suggests that the BBoR would reject the ‘real
risk test’ endorsed by the ECtHR when assessing deportation decisions. This would enable deportation of
individuals who face real risks of torture. While the document represents such a change as ‘clarifying’, it
would conflict with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The Conservatives’ proposals for changing Britain’s
human rights laws, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK’ (3 October 2014) 6 <www.conservatives.com/~/
media/files/downloadable%20Files/human_rights.pdf> accessed 10 August 2015.
36 This position is supported by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides that treaties
that make no specific provision for withdrawal should only be terminated where ‘(a) it is established that
the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) a right of denunciation
or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty’. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969,
Art 56.
37 Fitzmaurice accepted that numerous exceptions exist to this assumption. Other scholars disagree with this
assumption in general, Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Second Report on the Law of Treaties’ (1957) 2 Yearbook of
the International Law Commission 16, 22; Humphrey Waldock, ‘Second Report on the Law of Treaties’
(1963) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 36; Laurence Helfer, ‘Terminating Treaties’ in
Duncan Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press 2012) 634, 637.
38 Laurence Helfer, ‘Terminating Treaties’ in Duncan Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012) 634.
39 Laurence Helfer, ‘Terminating Treaties’ in Duncan Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2012) 634, 636.
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of successful renegotiation more achievable. Of course, this general reasoning is under-
mined in the context of the British-Irish Agreement, which is inherently connected to
the Multi-Party Agreement. As any renegotiation of the Multi-Party Agreement would
be dependent on the cooperation of a diverse array of actors with different interests,
the Conservative ambitions face considerable obstacles.
In addition to these formal points, however, the importance placed on commonality
of protection across the island raises even more issues. Interestingly, the Irish Govern-
ment did not commit to incorporating the ECHR in the Belfast Agreement, but it did
commit to considering the issue of incorporation in light of its commitment to ‘bring
forward measures to strengthen and underpin the constitutional protection of human
rights’.40 The Belfast Agreement was clearly ambiguous regarding the necessity of
Irish incorporation, merely requiring the Irish Government to ‘further examine’ the
option of incorporation. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the Irish commitment on
the issue of incorporation, and in spite of the contention that the Irish Constitution ade-
quately protected human rights, the Belfast Agreement was clearly a spur to action for
the introduction of the Irish ECHR Act 2003. The eventual enactment of the ECHR
Act 2003 was clearly influenced by the agreement to bring forward measures that
would ‘ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights as will pertain
in Northern Ireland’.41 The value of the Belfast Agreement was not in its contractual
nature, the value was the framework it created for cooperation between communities,
and cooperation between the British and Irish Governments. The continued success
of these relationships is contingent on a workable amount of trust and the decision of
the Irish Government to adopt a system analogous to that adopted in the UK and North-
ern Ireland was in line with the emphasis on equivalence in the negotiations.42 If Ireland
had decided not to incorporate the treaty, the work of the negotiators might have been
undermined. Human rights have always been a central part of the debate in Northern
Ireland. It is therefore not surprising that incorporation was seen as an attractive
40 Multi-Party Agreement 1998, 6.9.
41 Multi-Party Agreement 1998, 6.9.
42 James Friedberg, ‘Ambiguity, Sovereignty, and Identity in Ireland: Peace and Transition’ (2005) 20 Ohio
State Journal on Dispute Resolution 113, 113. While the ECHR Act 2003 derived significant inspiration
from the HRA 1998, the Irish Act offers weaker protection. Crucially, the scope of remedies available
under the ECHR Act 2003 is limited to damages. This compares unfavourably with the HRA 1998
which provides a much broader scope of remedies, including injunctive and declaratory remedies. A
breadth of remedies better ensures effective relief for claimants. Additionally, unlike under the HRA
1998, there is no duty on the Irish Government to declare new legislation Convention compatible or
otherwise. Colm O’Cinnéide, Equivalence in Promoting Equality: The Implications of the Multi-Party Agree-
ment for the Further Development of Equality Measures for Northern Ireland and Ireland (Equality Commis-
sion for Northern Ireland and Equality Authority 2005) 40; Donncha O’Connell, ‘Watched Kettles Boil
(Slowly): The Impact of the ECHR Act 2003’ in Ursula Kilkelly (ed), ECHR and Irish Law (Jordans
2008) 1. For further discussion of the ECHR Act 2003, see generally, Ursula Kilkelly (ed), ECHR and
Irish Law (Jordans 2008); Fiona de Londras and Cliona Kelly, European Convention on Human Rights
Act: Operation, Impact and Analysis (Thomson Reuters 2010).
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fulfilment of its commitment by the Irish Government. Gerard Hogan recognised the
symbolic importance of this when he said:
Incorporation at this level is important, since, in the context of the impending cross-
border bodies and the North-South ministerial Council, it is important to have a
neutral yardstick of fundamental rights protection. Irrespective of the legal virtues of
the Constitution as compared with the ECHR, the latter provides a politically neutral
template for sensitive cross-border dealings which [the] former could never hope to
attain.43
The incorporation of the ECHR Act 2003 signalled to members of the Unionist commu-
nity that Ireland would not rely on any self-proclaimed superior protection of the Irish
Constitution. More importantly, the incorporation represented equality for the entire
island, which has been identified as a clear goal of the Belfast Agreement. Accordingly,
the enactment of the ECHR Act 2003, even if not legally required, was a political impera-
tive in order to fulfil the goals of the Belfast Agreement. While achieving equivalence of
human rights protection is a legal requirement for the Irish and not the UK Govern-
ment, in light of the broader purpose of the Belfast Agreement there are clear policy
reasons for the UK to also pursue equivalence of rights in the North and South.44 As
pointed out by O’Cinnéide, without a parallel culture of rights protection, there is a
risk of deepened ‘suspicion and tensions between the different communities’.45 Further-
more, the fact that the UK committed to ‘complete’ incorporation could also be inter-
preted to tie the UK to the incorporation process that was already underway. A decision
to wholly depart from the Bill that was under consideration at the time the Belfast Agree-
ment was signed might be perceived as bad faith on behalf of the UK Government.46
Assessing the Proposed Repeal
O’Connell has argued that incorporation of the ECHR into Irish domestic law was
largely of ‘symbolic importance’ and that Ireland’s incorporation should be viewed
not solely as the fulfilment of a loose commitment under the Belfast Agreement but
43 Gerard Hogan, ‘Incorporation of the ECHR: Some Issues of Methodology and Process’ in Ursula Kilkelly
(ed), ECHR and Irish Law (Jordans 2004) 16.
44 Under the agreement, equivalence is concerned with ‘ensuring the same degree and extent of effective pro-
tection [in Ireland as there is in Northern Ireland], even if different forms of protection are occasionally
utilised to achieve this aim’. Colm O’Cinnéide, Equivalence in Promoting Equality: The Implications of
the Multi-Party Agreement for the Further Development of Equality Measures for Northern Ireland and
Ireland (Equality Commission for Northern Ireland and Equality Authority 2005) 34, 36.
45 Colm O’Cinnéide, Equivalence in Promoting Equality: The Implications of the Multi-Party Agreement for the
Further Development of Equality Measures for Northern Ireland and Ireland (Equality Commission for
Northern Ireland and Equality Authority 2005) 36.
46 In May 1997, the Labour Party released a White Paper setting out how the HRA 1998 would incorporate
the ECHR and in October 1997, the Bill was introduced to the House of Lords. By the time the Belfast
Agreement was signed in April 1998, the Bill was significantly progressed, receiving Royal Assent in
November 1998. Home Department, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (White Paper, Cm
3782, 1997).
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rather as the beginning of a ‘more fruitful “dialogue” between international human
rights obligations and municipal law’.47 It is important to consider what the Conserva-
tive Party’s commitment to a BBoR in lieu of the HRA 1998 is intended to represent. The
2015 Conservative Party Manifesto states that the BBoR will ‘break the formal link’
between British courts and the ECtHR.48 Such action suggests a desire on behalf of
the Conservative Party to reassert its sovereignty in the face of what is portrayed as
the increasing influence of ‘foreign values’ on the UK administration of justice. A key
example of how the Conservative Party intends to do this is by reducing the influence
of ‘problematic Strasbourg jurisprudence’ by reaffirming the sovereignty of the UK Par-
liament and removing the requirement that domestic judges should take the jurispru-
dence of the ECtHR into account.49 The desire to reduce European influence on UK
affairs is clearly echoed in calls to renegotiate Britain’s relationship with the European
Union and the desire for a referendum on whether Britain should exit the EU.
Accordingly, while the Conservative Party extols the merits of a BBoR, the current
conception appears to reflect a very particular perception of what constitutes ‘British-
ness’. While a ‘British Bill of Rights’ might be considered more ‘home grown’ and
could potentially lessen the anti-rights sentiment that has taken hold in much of the
British press, it also has the potential to alienate.50 While the semantic exclusion of
the Irish branch of the Union could be addressed with a title change, both the Scottish
and Welsh Governments are strongly opposed to a repeal of the HRA 1998.51 The pos-
ition in Northern Ireland is more complex, and while the Democratic Unionist Party has
never aligned itself with the Belfast Agreement, three other parties in the Northern Irish
Government—Sinn Féin, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, and the Alliance
Party—have criticised the Conservative Party plans for repeal.52
47 Donncha O’Connell, ‘The ECHR Act 2003: A Critical Perspective’ in Ursula Kilkelly (ed), ECHR and Irish
Law (Jordans 2004) 1.
48 Conservative Party Manifesto, ‘Strong Leadership, a Clear Economic Plan, a Brighter, More Secure Future’
(2015) 75 <www.conservatives.com/manifesto> accessed 10 August 2015.
49 The Conservatives’ proposals for changing Britain’s human rights laws, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the
UK’ (3 October 2014) 4 <www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/downloadable%20Files/human_rights.
pdf> accessed 10 August 2015.
50 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Tobias Lock (eds), ‘The Legal Implications of a Repeal of the Human Rights
Act 1998 and Withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights’ (12 May 2015) 18 <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2605487> accessed 10 August 2015.
51 The Scottish Government, ‘Human Rights Act Must Stay’ (3 October 2014) <news.scotland.gov.uk/News/
Human-Rights-Act-must-stay-10d4.aspx>; David Allen Green, ‘Why Repealing the Human Rights Act Is
Not Going to Be Easy’ Financial Times (London, 12 May 2015) <http://blogs.ft.com/david-allen-green/
2015/05/12/why-repealing-the-human-rights-act-is-not-going-to-be-easy/> accesssed 10 August 2015;
Libby Brooks, ‘Scotland “Will Not Consent” to Tory Plans to Scrap Human Rights Act’ The Guardian
(London, 12 May 2015) <www.theguardian.com/law/2015/may/12/scottish-government-human-rights-
act-conservatives> accesssed 10 August 2015; David Deans, ‘Welsh Government Will Do “Everything It
Can” to Block Repeal of the Human Rights Act’ (Wales Online, 18 May 2015) <www.walesonline.co.uk/
news/wales-news/welsh-government-everything-can-block-9279496> accesssed 10 August 2015.
52 Jeffrey Donaldson has reiterated that ‘the DUP has long argued that the United Kingdom should have a
Bill of Rights which recognises and respects the diversity of the devolved arrangements across the country’
and has stated that the DUP will, ‘as a minimum’, support reform of the HRA 1998 in order to ‘remove the
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Crucially, from the international law perspective, the Irish Government has
expressed misgivings about the repeal proposals. The Irish Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Charlie Flanagan, has stated that the Irish Government ‘[a]s a guarantor of
the Good Friday Agreement takes the responsibility to safeguard the Belfast Agreement
very seriously’.53 He has indicated the necessity to work closely with the UK Govern-
ment, including the Northern Ireland Secretary Theresa Villiers, in order to ‘ensure
that the protection of human rights remains at the heart of civic life and politics and
ongoing societal change in Northern Ireland’.54
In light of the foregoing, if the Conservative Party wishes to continue with its plans
to repeal, it is imperative that the UK engages in negotiations with the Irish Government.
As the existing Belfast Agreement emerged in the context of cross-party and community
cooperation and was subsequently supported by popular votes, such a renegotiation
would not be straightforward. The negotiations that led to the Belfast Agreement
lasted almost two years.55 In addition to the UK and Irish Governments, eight Northern
Irish political parties participated and the negotiations were conducted according to
detailed rules of procedure. According to a former Irish Attorney General and negotia-
tor, David Byrne, the complexity was the ‘inevitable result’ of the need for the nego-
tiations to be ‘as inclusive as possible’.56 Accordingly, any renegotiation of the Belfast
Agreement would be a challenging process that would most likely require the involve-
ment of the original negotiating parties. In addition, any attempt to modify the
‘right to family life’ defence against deportation upon conviction for a serious criminal offence’. Jeffrey
Donaldson, ‘Human Rights Act Has Failed Victims’ (12 May 2015) <www.mydup.com/news/article/
donaldson-human-rights-act-has-failed-victims> accesssed 10 August 2015. While Sinn Féin, the SDLP
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ment’ (12 May 2015) <www.sinnfein.ie/contents/34880> accesssed 10 August 2015; Alban Maginness,
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55 These two years were, of course, in addition to several years of preparatory work. Jennifer Todd,
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aspects of the Belfast Agreement that dealt with the Convention would most likely
require reconsideration of the entire Belfast Agreement. In order to explain the holistic
approach that was adopted in the negotiation process, David Byrne points out that
attempts to resolve one issue, or cluster of issues, without reference to others, or to start
from an assumption that all that was required was tinkering with present arrangements,
had been tried, and had failed, in the past.57
Taken as a whole, the Belfast Agreement is a comprehensive political agreement, and
its full implementation ‘is essential to the integrity and balance of the whole’.58 While
there have been persistent difficulties in implementation, any unilateral tinkering with
the original understanding has the potential to upset current cooperation and set the
peace process back severely.
A possible solution that could reconcile the UK’s obligations under the British-Irish
Agreement with the Conservative Party’s desire to repeal the HRA 1998 would be to
retain the HRA 1998 in Northern Ireland while repealing it in the rest of the UK.
While the issue of consent under the Sewel Convention would remain regarding
implementation in Scotland and Wales, it would resolve the international law question.
While maintaining the HRA 1998 in Northern Ireland would avoid a breach of inter-
national law, such a solution would add additional complexity and create undesirable
differences in human rights protection across the UK.59 Full appreciation of the impli-
cations of repealing the HRA 1998 is essential before any further plans are made.
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